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Abstract 
 
Demand response (DR) is envisaged to be of 
significance for enhancing the flexibility of power 
systems. The distributed nature of demand-side 
resources necessitates the need of an aggregator to 
represent the flexible demand in the electricity market. 
This paper presents a bilevel optimization model 
considering the optimal operation of a strategic 
aggregator in a day-ahead electricity market. 
Additionally, consumers’ requirements in terms of 
comfort satisfaction and cost reduction are considered 
by integrating detailed demand models and retail 
contract constraints. The results on the considered test 
system reveal that centralized optimization models 
would tend to over-estimate the capabilities of DR in an 
electricity market with strategic participants. Also, the 
flexibility value of DR for the power system and the 
profitability of the aggregator are significantly 
dependent on the retail contracts between the 
aggregator and the consumers, highlighting the need for 
careful contract design. 
 
1. Nomenclature 
 
Indices 
𝑗 Time index 
𝑘 Retail price discretization index 
𝑛 Archetype index 
𝑔 Conventional generator index 
 
Constants: 
𝑇𝑛,𝑟
𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑇𝑛,𝑟
𝑚𝑎𝑥      Minimum and maximum indoor temp. 
𝑂𝑛
𝑗
          Occupancy profile 
∆𝑗                    Time step 
∆𝜋                   Retail price discretization step 
𝜂𝑛                    Energy retention parameter of RTES 
𝜂𝑆                    Charging efficiency of pumped storage 
𝛼𝑛                    No. of buildings for each archetype 
𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛 . 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥       Minimum and maximum retail price 
𝛽                      Consumer cost reduction parameter 
𝜓𝐷
𝑗
                    Fixed demand bids 
𝜓𝑔
𝑗
                    Conventional generation marginal cost 
J                       Optimization time horizon 
G                      Number of generating units 
N                Number of building archetypes 
K                Number of discretization steps 
 
Variables: 
𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗
    Total power consumption of load aggregator 
𝜋𝑗    Retail price 
𝜆𝑗               Electricity SMP 
𝑇𝑛,𝑟
𝑗
            Indoor room temperature 
𝑄𝑛,ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡
𝑗
     Total heat input to building 
𝑄𝑛
𝑗
              Active heat output of RTES 
𝑄𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑗
     RTES storage heat losses 
𝑃𝑛
𝑗
              Power consumption of RTES 
𝐸𝑛
𝑗
              Storage level of RTES 
𝑃𝑔
𝑗
              Output of conventional generators 
𝑃𝑆,𝑑
𝑗
             Discharged power by pumped storage 
𝑃𝑆,𝑐
𝑗
             Charging power of pumped storage  
𝐸𝑆
𝑗
              Storage level of pumped storage 
 
2. Introduction  
 
Effective Demand Response (DR) can yield several 
benefits including lower electricity generation costs, 
reduced investments in generation, transmission and 
distribution assets, and alleviation of the challenges 
attributed to large-scale grid integration of variable 
renewables [1].  
A number of system-wide impact studies regarding 
demand flexibility have been reported in literature. For 
example, authors in [2], [3] show that temporal shifting 
of a price responsive load can potentially improve the 
economic operation of the power system. Recent studies 
have incorporated more detailed demand models in 
conventional centralized power system models (Unit 
Commitment/Economic Dispatch (UC/ED)) to assess 
the value of DR. The energy arbitrage potential of 
residential thermal loads has been evaluated in [4], [5], 
while flexibility of electric vehicles (EVs) has been 
discussed in [6], [7]. These integrated models highlight 
the importance of using detailed demand models in 
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terms of capturing the impacts of load shifting on the 
consumers and also on the supply mix and electricity 
prices. However, these centralized models assume a 
perfectly competitive market and, thus, do not take into 
account the strategic behavior and objectives of the 
various market players. 
The distributed nature of the large number of 
individual demand-side resources poses challenges for 
representing the flexibility and strategic objectives of 
these resource-owners (consumers) in the electricity 
market. Therefore, distributed demand-side resources 
are typically managed by load aggregators (LA), which 
act as intermediary agents between the consumers and 
the electric utility (e.g. the Transmission System 
Operator (TSO)). Although some demand-side 
resources (e.g. large industrial consumers) do not need 
LAs by virtue of the significant magnitude of their 
demand, however, here we focus on the general case of 
small-scale distributed demand-side resources which 
need to be coordinated for meaningful representation in 
the electricity market. The introduction of LAs, 
however, has given rise to several questions regarding 
the operation of LAs and their impacts on consumer 
welfare and system performance.  
Several studies have presented models focusing on 
the optimal operation LAs, subject to constraints on the 
flexible demand. An end-to-end business model for a 
profit maximizing aggregator is presented in [8]. The 
aggregator manages its portfolio of the population of 
DR participants and variable wind generation resource, 
and determines bids to place in the day ahead wholesale 
market. An optimization model for simultaneous 
allocation of frequency services and energy arbitrage for 
a fleet of Thermostatically Controlled Loads (TCLs) 
managed by an aggregator is presented in [8]. Similarly, 
LA-focused models for optimal control of Plug-in 
Electric Vehicles are presented in [9], [10]. Recently, 
papers considering the game-theoretic (Stackelberg) 
interaction between LAs (leaders) and the consumers 
(followers) for domestic thermal loads and PEVs [11] - 
[13] have been reported in the literature. These papers 
represent the LA as a profit-maximizing entity, which 
determines optimal retail prices for consumers, while 
consumers aim to minimize their costs subject to those 
retail prices. Although the aforementioned studies 
provide valuable operating frameworks for LAs, they 
tend to isolate the impact of the aggregator’s actions 
from the operation of the power system. This is because 
these studies consider electricity price as an exogenous 
parameter to the LA’s optimization problem and 
therefore, cannot account for the feedback impact of the 
change in demand on electricity prices. 
Papers considering strategic LA bidding in the 
electricity markets taking into consideration the impact 
of LA’s actions on the power system are rare with the 
exception of [14], [15]. These papers present bilevel 
models for considering the operation of a strategic LA 
controlling a fleet of PEVs. In these models, the LA 
aims to minimize its costs in the upper level, while at the 
lower level, the total welfare of all market participants 
is maximized. The results presented in these papers 
highlight the importance of modelling the LA as a 
strategic market player and of considering the impact of 
LA’s actions on the power system. However, as the 
objective of the LA in these models is to minimize its 
costs instead of maximizing profits, the proposed 
models do not capture the impacts of aggregator’s 
actions and the retail contracts on the financial welfare 
of PEV owners.  
 This paper explores the impacts of considering the 
consumers’ financial welfare in addition to their comfort 
constraints on the operation of a profit maximizing LA 
(also assumed to be the retailer for the consumers). The 
LA manages the space heating demand of consumers 
with residential thermal electric storage (RTES) 
devices. RTES devices contain a highly insulated solid 
thermal energy storage core which enables the 
conversion of electrical energy into thermal energy 
stored in an efficient manner for use at a later time [5]. 
When equipped with communications and control 
architecture, these devices can enhance power system 
flexibility by virtue of decoupling the scheduling of 
electric power demand from the time of thermal energy 
end-use. Such smart RTES technology is not only viable 
but also commercially available and deployed in several 
countries including Ireland, UK, France and the Nordic 
countries etc. [17]. 
   Additionally, we demonstrate the drawbacks of 
using exogenous price based models in terms of 
isolating the impacts of the actions of the LA from 
system operation. In summary, this paper extends the 
state-of-the art through the following contributions: 
1. A bilevel optimization model is implemented 
for optimal operation of a LA in an electricity 
market which is cleared based on social 
welfare maximization.  
2. Detailed thermal demand state-space models 
are utilized to capture buildings’ thermal 
dynamics and end-user comfort constraints 
associated to the RTES devices controlled by 
the LA. 
3. Formulation of optimal retail prices by the LA 
subject to consumers’ financial welfare 
constraints is integrated in the bilevel model to 
capture the impacts of various retail contracts 
on LA’s profitability, consumer welfare and 
system performance.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3 presents 
the mathematical formulation and linearization of the 
bilevel optimization problem. Section 4 discusses the 
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results of an illustrative example and Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
3. Model formulation  
 
In this section, we present the optimization model of 
a LA, which participates in the day-ahead electricity 
market (conducted by the system operator (SO)) on 
behalf of consumers with RTES space heating devices. 
In a competitive market, a strategic LA would aim to 
maximize its total welfare, which depends on the 
electricity System Marginal Price (SMP), accepted 
demand bids, the retail price set by the LA and the 
heating requirements of the consumers. However, the 
SMP is not only dependent on the actions of the LA, but 
also of the other participants in the market clearing 
process conducted by the SO. Therefore, the LA’s 
optimization problem is constrained by the outcome of 
the market clearing process. This problem exhibits a 
bilevel structure, where the LA maximizes its welfare in 
the upper-level problem and the market clearing process 
is represented in the lower-level problem. 
 
3.1. Consideration of consumers’ welfare 
 
As mentioned above, the LA manages the 
consumers’ RTES space heating devices. It is assumed 
that the consumers have direct load control (DLC) 
contracts with the LA, which allow the LA to control the 
RTES devices of residential consumers. Such contracts 
exist for both residential and commercial customers in 
several European and North American countries [18] - 
[19]. It is also assumed that the total welfare of the 
consumers comprises of the satisfaction of their thermal 
comfort and the increase in their financial welfare (i.e. 
reduced heating costs).  
Consumers’ thermal comfort is dependent on the 
indoor temperatures, which must be within the comfort 
range specified by the consumers. Therefore, the 
thermal comfort constraints of the consumers are 
incorporated by modelling the evolution of indoor 
temperatures using detailed thermal dynamics models of 
a number of building archetypes. It is assumed that the 
aggregate thermal behavior of all the dwellings 
managed by the LA can be represented using a few 
building archetype models [20]. The building thermal 
dynamics are modelled using lumped parameter 
building models (RC thermal networks). Initially, the 
detailed building performance models for the 
considered archetypes are developed in the EnergyPlus 
simulation platform to generate the synthetic thermal 
dynamics data [20]. The synthetic data is then utilized 
to calibrate the lumped parameter models using the 
calibration methodology presented in [21]. After 
expanding the heat balance equations for all the nodes, 
re-ordering terms, and discretizing the resulting 
continuous-time model, the building energy model can 
be represented by the state-space equation [5]: 
 𝑥𝑛
𝑗+1 = 𝐴𝑛𝑥𝑛
𝑗 + 𝐵𝑛,𝑢𝑄𝑛,ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡
𝑗 +
𝐵𝑛,𝑑[𝑇𝑎𝑚𝑏
𝑗 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑗 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ
𝑗 𝑇ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑗 ]  
(1) 
where, 𝑥𝑛
𝑗
 is state vector representing the temperatures 
at different nodes of the archetype, and 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵𝑛,𝑢 and 𝐵𝑛,𝑑 
are the state, input and disturbance matrices, 
respectively for archetype n at time interval j. The total 
heat provided by heating devices for the corresponding 
nodes of the archetype is incorporated in terms of 
𝑄𝑛,ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡
𝑗
 which is defined as follows: 
 𝑄𝑛,ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑄𝑛
𝑗 + 𝑄𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑗
 (2) 
where, 𝑄𝑛
𝑗
 is active heat power output and 𝑄𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑗
are the 
thermal storage losses of the RTES devices. Further 
details about the residential thermal modelling can be 
found in [5] and [21]. 
The nature of DLC contracts between the consumers 
and the LA entails that the consumers report their initial 
RTES charge levels and occupancy profiles to the LA at 
the start of the day. However, access to direct control of 
the devices and consumer information can result in the 
LA acting as an exploitative monopolistic retailer, 
resulting in loss of financial welfare (higher costs) for 
the consumers. Indeed, analysis of the Norwegian retail 
market has shown evidence of electricity retailers 
exhibiting monopolistic behavior by exploiting the 
passivity of some of their customers [22]. The 
consumers, on the other hand, would expect reduction 
in their costs as a compensation for giving up their 
privacy and control on the flexible RTES devices. 
Therefore, the retail contract design should take into 
consideration cost reduction for the consumers and 
prevent their exposure to exploitative retail prices by the 
LA. These consumer welfare related constraints are 
formulated and integrated in the LA’s optimization 
model described in Section 3.2. 
 
3.2. Load aggregator’s problem 
As discussed earlier, the LA is a strategic market 
participant, aiming to maximize its welfare. We assume 
that the LA maximizes its profits in order to achieve 
welfare maximization. The LA’s optimization problem 
is formulated as follows: 
 
max ∑ 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 (𝜋𝑗 − 𝜆𝑗)
𝐽
𝑗=1
 (3) 
 arg max: 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 , 𝜋𝑗 , 𝑇𝑛,𝑟
𝑗 , 𝑃𝑛
𝑗 , 𝑄𝑛
𝑗 , 𝑄𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑗 , 𝐸𝑛
𝑗       
subject to the following constraints: 
 𝑇𝑛,𝑟
𝑚𝑖𝑛 . 𝑂𝑛
𝑗 ≤ 𝑇𝑛,𝑟
𝑗 . 𝑂𝑛
𝑗 ≤ 𝑇𝑛,𝑟
𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 𝑂𝑛
𝑗 ,      (4) 
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∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝑁] 
 𝐸𝑛
𝑗+1 = 𝐸𝑛
𝑗 + 𝑃𝑛
𝑗 . ∆𝑗 − 𝑄𝑛
𝑗 − 𝑄𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑗 ,     
∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝑁]∀𝑗, ∀𝑛 
(5) 
 𝑄𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑗 = (1 − 𝜂𝑛). 𝐸𝑛
𝑗 , ∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛
∈ [1, 𝑁] 
(6) 
 0 ≤ 𝑄𝑛
𝑗 ≤ 𝑄𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ,    ∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝑁] (7) 
 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑛
𝑗 ≤ 𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ,      ∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝑁] (8) 
 0 ≤ 𝐸𝑛
𝑗 ≤ 𝐸𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ,      ∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝑁] (9) 
 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 = ∑ 𝛼𝑛. 𝑃𝑛
𝑗 ,
𝑛
    ∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝑁] (10) 
 𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝜋𝑗 ≤ 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥  ,           ∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽] (11) 
 1
𝐽
∑ 𝜋𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
≤
1
𝐽
∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
 (12) 
  
∑ 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 . 𝜋𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
≤ (
100 − 𝛽
100
) ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥
𝑗 . 𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥
𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
 (13) 
The objective function (3) of the LA’s optimization 
problem maximizes the day-ahead sum of its profits, 
which is defined as the difference between LA’s 
revenue from selling energy to its consumers (𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 . 𝜋𝑗) 
and its energy procurement costs from the day-ahead 
electricity market (𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 . 𝜆𝑗).  
Consumers’ thermal comfort and RTES technical 
constraints are modelled in Eqs. (4) – (9). Eq. (4) 
constrains the room temperature (𝑇𝑛,𝑟
𝑗
) to be within the 
thermal comfort limits during active occupancy periods. 
𝑇𝑛,𝑟
𝑗  is determined using the state space model described 
in Section 3.1. Eq. (5) models the evolution of the 
storage level of the RTES devices, while storage losses 
of RTES are calculated using (6). Eqs. (7) - (9) constrain 
the active heat output, electric power input and storage 
level of the RTES devices to be within their respective 
rated values. Finally, the total electricity consumption of 
the LA (𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗
) is described in (10) as the scaled up 
summation of the electricity consumption by each 
archetype, where the scaling factor (𝛼𝑛) is the total 
number of dwellings belonging to archetype n. Note that 
as mentioned above, the heating requirements 
determined by the representative archetype models are 
assumed to be representative of the total heating 
requirements of the LA-controlled dwellings. 
Consumers’ financial welfare constraints are 
incorporated by specification of the parameters of the 
retail contract between the consumers and the LA in (11) 
– (13). The constraints expressed in (11) restrict the 
retail prices (𝜋𝑗) to be within an agreed range to prevent 
the consumers from being exposed to exploitative retail 
prices. Additionally, (12) ensures that the average retail 
price throughout the day should be less than the average 
SMP of electricity for that day. Finally, constraint (13) 
specifies that the total daily electricity cost incurred by 
the consumers (∑ 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 . 𝜋𝑗𝑗 ) should be at least an agreed 
percentage (β) less than the costs the consumers paid 
when the RTES devices were operated as a fixed 
inflexible demand (∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥
𝑗 . 𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥
𝑗
𝑗 ), i.e. the 
consumer costs before the introduction of the LA. In 
order to determine the electricity consumption by the 
RTES devices before the introduction of the LA 
(𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥
𝑗
), it is assumed that the consumers previously 
operated their RTES devices as night-time storage 
loads. This assumption is justified by the fact that over 
the past few decades, residential thermal storage loads 
have conventionally been charged during the night-time 
in order to exploit the low off-peak tariffs [23]. Under 
this night-time charging scheme, all the RTES devices 
charge at their rated power (𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥) from 00:00 to 07:00 
until they are fully charged or until the night period 
ends. The fixed night time tariff (𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥
𝑗
) is determined 
in this paper by averaging the annual electricity SMPs 
(corresponding to hours 00:00 to 07:00)) obtained using 
the market clearing model presented in Section 3.3., 
keeping 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 =  𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥
𝑗 . 
 
3.3. Market clearing process 
The market clearing process, conducted by the SO, 
is a social welfare maximization model. It is assumed 
that based on historical market participation data and 
forecasting techniques, the LA can estimate the bids of 
other market participants [15]-[16]. Additionally, the 
technical details of the generating units can be accessed 
based on the reports published by the system operators. 
The market clearing process is formulated as the 
following optimization problem, with the corresponding 
Lagrange multipliers mentioned next to each constraint: 
  
min ∑ (−𝜓𝐷
𝑗
. 𝑃𝐷
𝑗
+  ∑ 𝜓𝑔
𝑗
. 𝑃𝑔
𝑗
𝐺
𝑔=1
− 𝜓𝑙𝐴
𝑗
. 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗
)
𝐽
𝑗=1
 (14) 
 arg min: 𝑃𝑔
𝑗 , 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 , 𝑃𝑆,𝑑
𝑗 , 𝑃𝑆,𝑐
𝑗 , 𝐸𝑆
𝑗 , 𝜆𝑗  
subject to: 
 
∑ 𝑃𝑔
𝑗
𝐺
𝑔=1
+ 𝑃𝑆,𝑑
𝑗 =  𝑃𝐷
𝑗 + 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 + 𝑃𝑆,𝑐
𝑗  ∶ 𝜆𝑗 , 
∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽]  
(15) 
 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑗 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥   ∶ µ𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑔
𝑗 , µ𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑔
𝑗 ,      (16) 
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∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑔 ∈ [1, 𝐺] 
 0 ≤ 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 ≤ 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∶ µ𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝐿𝐴
𝑗 , µ𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝐿𝐴
𝑗 , 
∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽] 
(17) 
 𝐸𝑆
𝑗 = 𝐸𝑆
𝑗−1 + 𝑃𝑆,𝑐
𝑗 . 𝜂𝑆 − 𝑃𝑆,𝑑
𝑗
 : µ
𝑆,𝐸
𝑗 , 
∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽] 
   (18) 
 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑆,𝑐
𝑗 ≤ 𝑃𝑆,𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∶ µ𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑆,𝑐
𝑗 , µ𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑆,𝑐
𝑗 , 
∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽] 
   (19) 
 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑆,𝑑
𝑗 ≤ 𝑃𝑆,𝑑
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∶ µ𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑆,𝑑
𝑗 , µ𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑆,𝑑
𝑗 ,    
∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽] 
 (20) 
 0 ≤ 𝐸𝑆
𝑗 ≤ 𝐸𝑆
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∶ µ𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝐸
𝑗 , µ𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝐸
𝑗 , 
 ∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽] 
(21) 
The objective function (14) of the market clearing 
model maximizes the total welfare of the market 
participants based on their bids (𝜓) and scheduled 
power consumption/generation. For the sake of 
simplicity, it is assumed that 𝑃𝐷
𝑗
 represents the fixed 
inflexible electricity demand in the market. Eq. (15) 
models the power balance constraint, which ensures that 
the total generation by conventional generators (𝑃𝑔
𝑗
) and 
the power discharged by the large-scale storage unit 
(𝑃𝑆,𝑑
𝑗
) should satisfy the sum of the inflexible load (𝑃𝐷
𝑗
), 
the flexible load represented by the aggregator (𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗
) and 
the charging load of the storage unit (𝑃𝑆,𝑐
𝑗
). In this study, 
we have modeled a pumped hydro unit as the large-scale 
storage unit. It can be noted that the Lagrange multiplier 
of the power balance constraint represents the market 
clearing price of electricity. Eq. (16) limits the power 
generation of the conventional generators to be within 
their minimum and maximum values, respectively, 
while (17) restricts the LA’s power consumption to be 
within the minimum and maximum limits. The 
maximum power consumption limit for the LA (𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑚𝑎𝑥) 
is defined as ∑ 𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑛 . The evolution of the storage level 
(𝐸𝑆
𝑗
) in the pumped storage unit is modeled in (18), 
while technical constraints of this pumped storage unit 
are expressed in (19) – (21). 
 
3.4. Formulation of the bilevel model 
 
As discussed earlier, the optimal strategic operation 
of the LA can be formulated as a bilevel optimization 
model, with the upper level (UL) corresponding to the 
LA’s optimization problem and the lower level (LL) 
corresponding to the market clearing process. This 
section describes the formulation of this bilevel problem 
into an equivalent single-level problem and subsequent 
linearization of this single-level problem. 
As the LL problem is linear, it can be guaranteed that 
any solution which satisfies its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 
(KKT) conditions would also be the optimal solution of 
the problem [24]. Therefore, we replace the LL market 
clearing process with its KKT stationarity and 
complementarity slackness conditions. However, the 
complementarity slackness conditions are nonlinear. 
These conditions are then linearized based on the 
Fortuny-Amat transformations [25], by introducing 
binary variables and large constants. The detailed 
mathematical formulation of the stationarity conditions 
and the linearization of the complementarity slackness 
conditions of the market clearing process using Fortuny-
Amat transformations can be referred to in [15], which 
has a similar implementation. 
The remaining non-linearities in the optimization 
problem are in the objective function (3) of the LA, 
which includes bilinear terms for LA’s revenue (𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 . 𝜋𝑗) 
and LA’s costs (𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 . 𝜆𝑗). The revenue term can be 
linearized by implementing a discretized approximation 
of the retail price 𝜋𝑗 as follows: 
 
𝜋𝑗 = 𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛 + ∆𝜋. ∑ 𝜉𝑘
𝑗
𝐾
𝑘=1
 (22) 
 𝜉𝑘
𝑗 ≤ 𝜉𝑘−1
𝑗  ∀𝑘 ∈ [2, 𝐽] (23) 
where, 𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛is the minimum retail price, ∆𝜋 is the retail 
price step (
𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐾
) and 𝜉𝑘
𝑗
 are the binary variables 
for each discrete step, indexed by k. Using this 
discretization, the revenue term can be written as: 
 
𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 . 𝜋𝑗 = 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 . 𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛 + ∆𝜋. ∑ 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 . 𝜉𝑘
𝑗
𝐾
𝑘=1
 (24) 
Next, we define a new variable 𝜔𝑘
𝑗 = 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 . 𝜉𝑘
𝑗
, which 
leads to the equation: 
   
𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 . 𝜋𝑗 = 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 . 𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛 + ∆𝜋. ∑ 𝜔𝑘
𝑗
𝐾
𝑘=1
 (25) 
The term 𝜔𝑘
𝑗
 can be transformed into the following 
linear constraints using a large constant (𝑀𝜋): 
 0 ≤ 𝜔𝑘
𝑗 ≤ 𝜉𝑘
𝑗 . 𝑀𝜋, ∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑘 ∈ [1, 𝐾] (26) 
 0 ≤ 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 − 𝜔𝑘
𝑗 ≤ (1 − 𝜉𝑘
𝑗). 𝑀𝜋 , ∀𝑘 ∈ [1, 𝐾] (27) 
The remaining bilinear cost term (𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗 . 𝜆𝑗) can be 
linearized by using the strong duality theorem, 
according to which the primal and dual objectives are 
equal at optimality [26]. Therefore, the strong duality 
theorem allows exact linearization of the LA’s cost 
term. Applying the strong duality theorem and using the 
stationarity and complementarity slackness conditions 
of the LL problem yields: 
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  𝜆𝑗 . 𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗
= −𝜓𝐷
𝑗
. 𝑃𝐷
𝑗
+  ∑ 𝜓𝑔
𝑗
. 𝑃𝑔
𝑗
𝑔 + 𝜆
𝑗 . 𝑃𝐷
𝑗
+
∑ 𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑔
𝑗
. 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑔 − µ𝑆,𝐸
1 . 𝐸𝑆
0 + 𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑆,𝑐
𝑗
. 𝑃𝑆,𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥 +
𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑆,𝑑
𝑗
. 𝑃𝑆,𝑑
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝐸
𝑗
. 𝐸𝑆
𝑚𝑎𝑥  
(28) 
Using (25) and (28), the linearized reformulated single-
level problem becomes: 
 max  (𝑃𝐿𝐴
𝑗
. 𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛 + ∆𝜋. ∑ 𝜔𝑘
𝑗
𝑘 ) − (−𝜓𝐷
𝑗
. 𝑃𝐷
𝑗
+
 ∑ 𝜓𝑔
𝑗
. 𝑃𝑔
𝑗
𝑔 + 𝜆
𝑗 . 𝑃𝐷
𝑗
+ ∑ 𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑔
𝑗
. 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑔 −
µ𝑆,𝐸
1 . 𝐸𝑆
0 + 𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑆,𝑐
𝑗
. 𝑃𝑆,𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑆,𝑑
𝑗
. 𝑃𝑆,𝑑
𝑚𝑎𝑥 +
𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝐸
𝑗
. 𝐸𝑆
𝑚𝑎𝑥)  
(29) 
subject to (4)-(13), (15)-(21), KKT stationarity 
conditions, Fortuny-Amat linearization of KKT 
complementarity conditions, and (22)-(27). The 
resulting single-level optimization problem lies in the 
category of Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) 
which, although is non-convex because of the presence 
of binary variables, but, can be solved efficiently using 
commercial solvers. 
 
4. Results and Discussion  
 
This section discusses the preliminary results 
obtained using the proposed bilevel model on the 
impacts of strategic behavior and consumer constraints 
on the welfare of the various entities involved. 
Additionally, some insightful results highlighting the 
potential drawbacks of exogenous price based models as 
compared to integrated models are presented. 
 
4.1. Test system 
 
The developed bilevel model has been used to 
conduct an annual analysis of consumer welfare, LA’s 
profitability, and system performance under various 
scenarios.  The conventional generation portfolio of the 
test system including the number of units and marginal 
costs have been modelled according to [27]. The 
installed generation capacities have been adjusted 
according to the system peak load requirements. The 
bids of the generating units are assumed to be equal to 
their marginal costs. System inflexible demand profiles 
are obtained using normalized system demand profiles 
for the Irish power system for the year 2009 [28]. These 
normalized profiles are scaled up keeping 7.2 GW as the 
system peak load. The parameters of the two pumped 
hydro units are modelled according to [29]. To model 
the residential space heating demand, three Irish midflat 
archetypes based on different periods and materials of 
construction are considered. The total number of 
midflats considered is circa 70,000 [20] and the thermal 
modelling assumptions, and RTES technical 
characteristics are modelled as described in [5]. 
The following models are implemented to compare 
and understand the impacts of integrated and bilevel 
modelling on system performance and LA profitability. 
1. Centralized – Inflexible RTES demand (C-IFD): The 
generation and RTES charging schedules are 
obtained using the centralized market clearing model 
(Section 3.3.), with integrated building models [5] 
but with RTES devices operating as night-time 
storage. 
2. Centralized – Flexible RTES demand (C-FD): The 
generation and RTES charging schedules are 
obtained using the centralized market clearing model 
(Section 3.3.), with integrated building models and 
keeping RTES demand flexible. As this model study 
determines RTES charging schedules through non-
strategic centralized dispatch, it represents the 
optimal usage of RTES flexibility from the system’s 
perspective. 
3. Exogenous prices – Cost minimization (E-CM): The 
LA takes exogenous electricity SMPs as input to its 
optimization model (Section 3.2.), which minimizes 
the LA’s total cost.  
4. Bilevel – Cost minimization (B-CM): The strategic 
market operation of the LA is considered using the 
bilevel model described in Section 3.4., keeping cost 
minimization as LA’s objective. 
5. Bilevel – Profit Maximization (B-PM): The 
strategic market operation of the LA is considered 
using the bilevel model described in Section 3.4., 
keeping profit maximization as LA’s objective. 
The contract parameters β, and the minimum and 
maximum retail price limits are taken as exogenous 
inputs in the model. For the base case in all the models, 
the values of β = 20% (i.e. 20% consumer cost 
reduction), 𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛= 30€/MWh (lowest marginal cost of 
conventional generators), 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥= 93€/MWh (highest 
marginal cost of conventional generators). In order to 
understand how different values of these contract 
parameters could affect the different stakeholders, a 
sensitivity analysis for β and 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥  has been presented 
in Section 4.2. Additionally, the retail price is equal to 
SMP for the C-FD, E-CM and B-CM models, while it is 
equal to the night time tariff for the C-IFD model.  
The models are implemented in GAMS and are 
solved at hourly resolution with a look-ahead horizon of 
24 hours assuming perfect forecast. It must be noted that 
the assumption of perfect forecast might not be realistic 
for modelling the market clearing problem, especially 
with large penetration of variable renewable resources. 
However, this assumption has been made to ensure 
computational tractability of the bilevel model given the 
requirement of path dependent optimization for 
management of storage devices. Also, in the case study 
that follows, variable renewable resources are not 
included. 
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4.2. Importance of integrated modelling 
 
Figure 1 shows the total power consumption of the 
LA and SMP for the E-CM and C-FD models in order 
to highlight the importance of using integrated models 
as compared to exogenous price-based models. The 
SMP profile from C-FD is used as input for the E-CM 
model and the resulting LA power consumption is fed 
back to the C-FD model to determine the impacts on 
SMP.  
It can be observed from panel (A) in Figure 1 that 
even though the objective of E-CM is to reduce LA 
costs, the resulting power consumption profile is 
different from C-FD. This is because the minimum cost 
solution for E-CM is not unique, therefore, several 
power consumption profiles can have the same cost for 
the LA while meeting the heating requirement (e.g. 
when input SMP is the same for several hours of the 
day). These differences in power consumption would be 
expected to be further increased when the LA would aim 
to maximize profits. The resulting impact on SMP is 
shown in panel (B) of Figure 1. It can be seen e.g. for 
hours 6 and 7 that the increased concentration of power 
consumption for the E-CM model would have a 
feedback impact on SMP resulting in higher prices as 
compared to those initially determined using C-FD. 
Changes in SMP also imply that exogenous price based 
models can also lead to additional start-ups and shut-
downs of generation units, making the system operation 
less economical. Therefore, these results highlight the 
merits of using integrated models for analysis of flexible 
demand instead of exogenous price based models. 
 
4.3. Impacts of strategic behavior 
The impacts of the LA’s strategic behavior on the 
consumers’ welfare and the power system operation are 
depicted in Figure 2. It can be observed in panel (A) that 
in the inflexible night time storage model (C-IFD), the 
heating energy consumption for each house is very high 
compared to C-FD (approximately 64% of the energy 
consumption in C-IFD). This is because under night 
time operation, the RTES devices are fully charged 
every day irrespective of the daily heating requirement, 
making their operation very inefficient in terms of 
energy consumption. When aiming to minimize its costs 
(B-CM), the LA reduces the power it purchases and thus 
the results are almost identical to the centrally optimal 
values determined in C-FD. However, when 
maximizing profits (B-PM), the LA purchases much 
more energy from the electricity market in order to 
achieve the maximum possible revenue from selling the 
energy to the consumers. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the profit maximization behavior of a LA with DLC 
would not be energy efficient. However, the energy 
consumption is still circa 2% lower than the inflexible 
C-IFD case as the LA is bound to reduce consumer costs 
due to constraint (13).   
These differences in heating energy consumption 
profiles translate into differences in consumer costs as 
shown in panel (B). The results show that the consumers 
would have to pay only 39% of the costs they paid in the 
C-IFD case if the LA aims to minimize its costs (B-CM) 
and pass on all the cost reductions to the consumers. The 
profit maximization behavior (B-PM) expectedly results 
Figure 1. Importance of integrated modelling 
 Figure 2. Impacts of LA’s strategic 
behavior on consumer and system 
welfare   
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in higher costs for consumers as the LA tries to 
maximize its revenues. However, the consumers still are 
better off when being controlled by a profit maximizing 
LA as compared to the inflexible night storage operation 
due to the cost reduction constraint (13). Indeed, the 
consumer costs are reduced by circa 20% as specified 
by the retail contract parameter β.  
Finally, the impacts of strategic LA behavior on 
annual system generation costs are presented in panel 
(C). The performance of B-CM is again almost identical 
to the centralized C-FD as in order to minimize costs, 
the LA not only reduces the energy consumption but 
also purchases energy during low SMP periods, thereby 
aligning its performance with centrally optimized 
results. However, LA’s profit maximization increases 
the system costs as compared to C-FD primarily because 
of the increase in energy consumption. However, B-PM 
can still achieve significant reduction in generation costs 
as compared to C-IFD. This is because in C-IFD, the 
RTES devices consume fixed amounts of energy 
irrespective of the system conditions while in B-PM, the 
LA purchases energy during periods of low SMP to 
increase its profit margin. These results highlight that 
the behavior and objectives of the LA can not only have 
significant implications for the consumers, but also on 
the power system operation. It must also be noted that 
the model presented in the paper assumes that the LA 
can manage the operation of all the RTES devices 
owned by the consumers who have chosen to enter the 
DLC contract. If some of the consumers choose to opt 
out from the DLC contract, the LA would have a 
reduced magnitude of controllable demand, which could 
translate into reduced profitability of the LA and 
increased system generation costs. 
It can be concluded from the results presented above 
that centrally optimized results would not be valid in the 
presence of a strategic LA as they would tend to 
overestimate the system value of flexible load. 
Nevertheless, the presence of a profit maximizing LA is 
still beneficial for the system as compared to the loads 
being inflexible.  
 
4.4. Impacts of retail contract design 
 
As mentioned in Section 3, the LA has a direct load 
control (DLC) contract with the consumers subject to 
retail contract constraints (11) – (13). In this section, we 
explore the impacts of varying the retail contract 
parameters β (consumer cost reduction percentage) and 
𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥(maximum retail price) in the LA’s profit 
maximization (B-PM) model.  
It can be seen in panel (A) of Figure 3 that as the 
agreed consumer cost reduction increases (i.e. 
𝛽 increases), there is a significant reduction in heating 
energy consumption because the LA is bound to reduce 
the consumer costs. Additionally, as the maximum retail 
price (𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥) increases, there are some additional 
reductions in energy consumption. This is because 
increase in 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥  allows the LA to purchase lesser 
energy without impacting the profitability (i.e. by 
charging higher prices to consumers for smaller 
volumes of energy). Therefore, restricting the LA’s 
profitability by increasing 𝛽 improves energy 
efficiency, while restricting the LA’s profitability by 
reducing 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥  would reduce the energy efficiency.   
The impacts of the retail contracts on consumer costs 
are shown in panel (B). As expected, higher values of 𝛽, 
result in lower consumer costs as compared to the C-
IFD model. It can also be observed that for a given value 
of β, the maximum retail price (𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥) does not have any 
noticeable impacts on consumer costs. This is because 
the LA only needs to reduce consumer costs by 𝛽%, so 
for smaller values of 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥 , the LA purchases more 
energy in order to offset the impact of reduced 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥 .  
Figure 3. Importance of the specification 
of retail contract parameters 
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Panel (C) presents the impacts of the retail contracts 
on LA’s profitability. It can be noticed that 𝛽 has a very 
significant impact on LA’s profits as an increase in 𝛽 
from 0% to 40% reduces the LA’s profits by circa 80%. 
This can be explained by the fact that reduction in 𝛽 
reduces the LA’s revenue, while the LA’s cost reduction 
by reducing energy consumption is bounded by 
consumer’s thermal comfort requirements, thereby 
resulting in much lower profits. For a given value of β, 
increase in 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥  allows the LA to achieve increase in 
profits as the LA can purchase energy only during 
periods of low SMP and charge higher retail prices to 
the consumers.  
Finally, the impacts on system generation costs are 
shown in panel (D). The generation costs profile mirrors 
the heating energy consumption profile shown in Panel 
(A). As discussed earlier, increasing 𝛽 and 
increasing 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥 force the LA to be energy efficient and 
to purchase energy during periods of low SMP, 
respectively, thereby reducing the system generation 
costs, and thus driving the results towards centrally 
optimal values.  
The analysis presented above leads to the conclusion 
that for contracts involving direct load control (DLC),  
𝛽 has a much greater impact on consumers’, LA’s and 
system’s welfare as compared to 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥 . Additionally, 
contrary to intuition, allowing the LA to charge higher 
retail prices would be socially beneficial under DLC 
contracts. This is due to the fact that increasing 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥  for 
a given value of β doesn’t impact the consumers’ 
welfare, but results in higher profits for the LA and 
lower system generation costs, thereby improving the 
net social welfare. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper presented a novel bilevel formulation for 
understanding the impacts of the strategic behavior of a 
profit maximizing load aggregator (LA) in the 
electricity market while being constrained by 
consumers’ welfare based on retail contract 
specifications. The results of the bilevel model were 
compared with other models including centralized and 
exogenous price based models. The results depicted the 
drawbacks of exogenous price based models in terms of 
not being able to capture the feedback impact of change 
in demand on electricity price. Additionally, based on 
the preliminary results for the considered test system 
presented in this paper, it was observed that the strategic 
profit maximizing behavior of the LA results in 
deviation of system performance from centrally 
optimized results, thereby indicating that centralized 
models would tend to overestimate the system value of 
demand response. Finally, the need for carefully 
designing the retail contract parameters was 
highlighted, as they not only affect the welfare of the 
consumers and the LA but also the operation of the 
power system.  
Future work would present more detailed results 
using the proposed model and present some additional 
sensitivities of other important parameters. 
Additionally, the market clearing problem presented in 
this paper doesn’t incorporate variable renewable 
resources. The inclusion of these resources would 
require consideration of the uncertainty associated to the 
prediction of these resources. Moreover, consumer opt-
out contingency could also be formulated as a stochastic 
event with a certain probability distribution. Therefore, 
the framework presented in this paper could be extended 
by formulating it as a stochastic optimization problem 
and considering the impacts of uncertainty on the value 
of aggregator-controlled flexible demand. Additionally, 
it would also be interesting to explore the operation of 
the LA when it simultaneously participates in provision 
of ancillary services in addition to energy arbitrage. 
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